Vladimir Ahmedov (PhD)
“Russian team” in Syria?
As pulling the timing of convening a conference on Syria international activity, which should become the epicenter of Geneva, where it is planned its execution, increases in direct proportion to the escalation of warfare in Syria itself, the center of which is today Aleppo (Halab). Leading to the various international venues diplomatic battle for the “Geneva-I2» and bloody battle for Aleppo (Halab) are long parallel paths, using different methods and means, but at the same time, pursue the same goal – to ensure the transition of power in Syria. While there is reason to hope that, contrary to the laws of Euclidean geometry, these paths can, if you do not intersect, then, at least, match.
In fact, from the results of an eventual meeting in Geneva may depend not only on the lives of thousands of Syrians, but the fate of Syria itself, further ways of development and prospects of establishing a new order in the Middle East. In this regard, it is hoped that the periodic meetings of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his American counterpart, if not dot the «i», then, at least, give the general impression of the true intentions of the US and Russia on Syria issue of concern not only to their European counterparts, demonstrating the growing discouragement while, but, above all, all Syrians, as did the rest of the Arabs and non-Arabs and.
But, if possible plans of the Obama administration can somehow be judged on the basis of numerous applications (formal, semi-formal, informal) representatives from various US agencies and allied them to all sorts of organizations, Moscow’s position in the Syrian issue, despite all the “transparency and a sequence of “our diplomacy continues to be a lot of questions, both in the Arab world and the West. It is clear that the Russian soul to the West has always been a mystery. Obviously, so they continue to study carefully the creativity FMDostoevsky.
Meanwhile, on the Russian policy in Syria, in terms of attempts to explain her written and said a lot in various publications, “thin and thick” magazines, in numerous interviews and materials of different case studies, both in Russia and abroad . But the question of what it wants Russia to Syria, and why Moscow is slow in making a final decision on the Syrian issue, continues to acutely worried about a significant part of the world community.
Not to repeat the well-known set of provisions and arguments on this issue, the author decided to turn to the memoirs of a former officer of the Syrian secret services of Brigadier General “IM”, held in one of the training centers in the 70-th of the last century the severe school of the KGB, which he shared in the pages of the Arabic-speaking Internet publication.
According to him, during the reign of Hafez al-Assad to the end of the 1990s, Moscow has played a key role in determining the main directions of the foreign policy of Syria. Matches the exclusive role of the USSR and then Russia in Syria is provided by a number of special circumstances, one of which was the presence of so-called “Russian team” in the shadow of Syrian power structures. Its representatives had the opportunity to directly influence the mechanism of decision-making on key issues of foreign policy.
“Russian team” was formed as an organized group in the early 70s and successfully operated until the end of the 90-ies of XX century. Basically it consisted of graduates of Soviet military schools, some of which was trained in intelligence centers of the KGB. Many of them have very high positions in the army, the Syrian security services, leadership of the ruling Baath Party. On most of them little known in the West and in the Middle East. A number were known only by virtue of their high positions in the public service. But the presence of “Russian team” did not know almost no one, even in Syria itself.Characteristically, despite their tremendous opportunities, thanks to hold positions in the system of real power, the team members, as can be inferred from the memoirs of Brigadier General. collaborated with Moscow mainly on the general political and ideological basis, exclusively on foreign policy and do not touch the “internal political kitchen” in Syria. In our opinion, this fact could indicate the highest degree of trust between the leaders of Syria and the Soviet Union (Russia) and the presence of tacit agreement between the relevant agencies of the two countries.
Work “team” was carried out on a sufficiently favorable background, which was designated a special attitude to Hafez al-Assad on foreign policy making. Firstly, foreign policy at H.Asade was totally pragmatic (secular) in nature and was subject to the achievement of the main goal – to confirm the role and place of the SAR as the center of the Arab Mashreq with balanced relations with Iran and Syria, KSA and good relations with the West.Secondly, H.Asad believed that the sphere of foreign policy should not be the domain of the “siloviki” and considered “overkill” unauthorized person named special services’ interference in this sensitive area. In this regard, he tried to reduce their exposure to the army and security services on the process of developing the most important foreign policy decisions. In this regard, the names of many original architects of the Syrian foreign policy were not well known even to a narrow circle close to the Syrian president, and the proposed solutions only formally carried out by the Syrian Foreign Ministry.
For example, Brigadier General “IM” was, according to him, the author of many of the key decisions in matters of building relations with Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon from 1976 to 1999. In view of the above there H.Asad relationship to the role of intelligence agencies in matters of foreign policy, members of the “Russian team” acted largely independently, outside the control of the Syrian security forces. For example “IM” leads another member of this group of Brigadier General “MS”, who oversaw one of the most important parts of the Russian-Syrian cooperation, he died under mysterious circumstances at his estate on the Mediterranean coast in Latakia. Another member of the “Russian team” A. better known in narrow circles as the “al-Ahtabut.” One of its main tasks was to prevent “distortions” in the foreign policy of SAR, as a result of a voluntary intervention in this sector leadership of a number of leading Syrian security services. It was he obliged to resign M.Holi and B.Nadjar.
One of the important factors of effective work “Russian team” was that its members were not corrupt, do not put personal gain factor at the heart of their work, have not experienced personal financial dependence on Iran and KSA and took care of maintaining the balance in the relationship with their CAP Arab and regional partners. According to brigadier general “IM” “Russian team” acted in the interests of national security of Syria, which fully meets Moscow’s policy in the Middle East, which looked at Damascus as its outpost in the region and tried not to impose the Syrian leadership their political “agenda”.
It is curious that, despite its broad penetration in Syria, Iran learned about the existence of “Russian team” relatively recently and was very wary of this fact. However, owing to a special relationship with Moscow, Tehran was forced to put up with its existence in the depths of the Syrian government. At the same time, one can not exclude the fact that the relevant departments of Iran could have the task of gradually weaken the work of the “team” and reduce the extent of its influence on the development of foreign policy decisions. But it would be naive to believe that as soon as Tehran was interested in it, other external players on the Syrian field could set ourselves the task similar way. There were opponents of “Russian team” and within Syria itself.
Critical to the “Russian team” was in 1999, which was, full of a number of adverse events in Syria, said as it turned out, very negative on the most important domestic and foreign policy development processes of the country. During this period, there was a strong exacerbation H.Asad that intensified competition for power within his inner circle and, as a result, contributed to deepening divisions within the ruling elite. It was during this period of “Russian team” decided to come to grips with the influential Syrian intelligence services t General Bahdje Suleiman. According to “IM” he first sought approaches to the members of the “team”, hoping to use their influence to strengthen its position in the immediate vicinity H.Asad. But then could not find a common language with them, and was rejected.
By the end of the 90s the situation inside the vertical of power in the SAR has changed dramatically as a result of a series of large-scale rearrangements in the army and security services, which are held within H.Asad taken his course there is no alternative to Bashar as his successor on the power field. Members of the “Russian team” had to deal with a number of highly influential figures within the new regime, and gradually began to weaken their position. It is interesting that, as said IM, one of the few who tried to help the individual members of the “team” was Assef Shawkat. Maybe he just did not see the whole picture, and had no idea with whom, exactly, is dealing with. In addition, during this period he enjoyed relative independence, being the daughter of her husband and sister H.Asada future president. But even he could not save the intercession of some members of the “team”, which will soon actually dissolved and ceased his work.
Gradually, their place in the shadow structures Syrian authorities took a group Bahdjet Suleiman, who at that time was able to get close to Bashar al-Assad and his influential cousins. One of the companions of B. Suleiman became a Major-General Hisham al-Bakhtiar, who became responsible for foreign policy and national security of SAR. In the narrow Syrian circles it is well known as the “people of Iran in Syria,” as indicated by its name. It is credited with unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran, Damascus, which is extremely negative impact on the site of SAR in Arab Mashreq, plunged the country into an endless regional struggle, turning Syria into a “playing card” in the global fight against powers in the Middle East.
According to Brigadier General “IM” Moscow saw what was going on with her former “Russian team.” Perhaps, following its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a friendly Syria, or on the basis of some other considerations, the Russian leadership is in fact little is done to prevent the departure of the group from the corridors of real power in the SAR. On the other hand, and in Russia by that time, much has changed. Perhaps Moscow decided to try to strengthen its relations with the new team on a new basis, which is more than meets the spirit of the time, where one of the main mottos became free market. And, perhaps, much has been done. And so to all and continued (for some time), if not for the “Arab Spring”.
Recalls IM from the beginning of the “Arab Spring” various Russian intelligence services were “scour” on Syria in search of members of his former “Russian team.” Moscow, however, got a nasty surprise. As a result of careful search revealed that no one, none of the members of the “Russian team” was not even in the slightest degree of significant positions in the Syrian leadership. As mentioned above, Moscow, of course, aware that “Russian team” is gradually weakening. But did not expect that it will be “cleaned” with such care.
Perhaps also for this reason, Moscow continues to hold on to Bashar al-Assad and his regime, knowing that if the wrong time (this is the key phrase) turn away from Damascus, Syria is in danger of losing, if not forever, then for a long time.
First published in July 2013
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