Vladimir Ahmedov
The army and Islamist in the Arab Maghreb.
(For background information)
Starting from the 60s. XX century the government of King Hassan II was to encourage the Islamist, especially coming from Saudi Arabia, seeing them as a natural barrier to the spread popular in Morocco at the time the ideas of Arab nationalism, to actively promote the leader of Egypt, GA Nasser. Despite the skepticism about the ideology of Salafism among most of the ruling elite Moroccan, Moroccan authorities at the time from a broader interests associated primarily with the relationship with Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United States were interested in the support of Riyadh their position on Western Sahara Many imams who came from Saudi Arabia, thanks to sanction local authorities quickly enough to get permission to build mosques and madrassas, which were located mostly within the city outskirts. It was from there begun to increase the impact of these imams and Salafi-jihadist ideas, especially in poor and socially disadvantaged environment Moroccan shanty towns. The result was not long in coming.
At the end of July 2006 the Moroccan security services dismantled a previously unknown terrorist group Ansar al-Mahdi and arrested the 44 members. In the future, the number of prisoners has increased to 56 people in various, mainly north of the country. The group is a unique character. On the composition of the members was very eclectic. In its composition, along with drug traffickers and several wives pilots Moroccan international airlines were also representatives of the army.
The military wing of the group led by Hassan al-Khattab. It was a well-known supporter of Salafi-jihadist Islam, who was arrested in 2003 after the bombings in Casablanca. In contrast to the previously known terrorist groups, whose composition is socially formed mainly from the poorer sections of the working population, this group sought to transcend social barriers and recruited its members from various sectors of society. Moreover, the fact that a part of said group included several military, whose experience were going to use to organize attacks on government facilities and tourist resorts are meant for Moroccan security forces fundamentally new stage in the fight against radical Islam.
Salafi jihadism, which was officially condemned by the Moroccan authorities after the bombings in Casablanca, is a very amorphous movement, which was attended by supporters of radical interpretation of ideas of Salafism, which in their opinion is allowed to use violence. In a move was not well-organized command structure. The roots of this movement went into the activities of the network of some Saudi imams who redefined traditionally apolitical idea of the true Salafism and replaced them with political rhetoric, slogans and practice of violence.
Moroccan armed forces are not always served as guard of royal power. In the early 1970s the Moroccan military were involved in two abortive coup attempts against King Hassan II of Morocco, father of the current monarch. However, unlike the situation in 2006-2007, at the head of the failed coup were army officers, and on the Islamists and the speech was not. Moreover, their aim was to overthrow the monarchy, not an attempt to change society. In this regard, the official recognition of the Moroccan authorities to the fact that the members of the group Ansar al-Mahdi army officers were meant that the government saw this as the primary threat to not only the authorities but also its nature and pointed to the seriousness of the situation. Different sources have different definitions of military affiliation, members of al-Mahdi.
Most sources agree on the five soldiers who had experience with explosives. According to others soldiers worked at the airbase in Salé (Sale). According to Western journalists who where able to talk with the family of the arrested Mohammed Haluk (Mohamed Khalouki), they were not any terrorists, as stated, but simply a gang war, looting and robbery Even less information could be gleaned from official sources, in connection with Full closing theme of the penetration of the Islamists in the army. As well, there was no information about what the organization were officers, as in this case, it could mean a deeper penetration of the Islamists in the army, because the officers were able to give commands. There was also no information about the possible involvement of soldiers in elite units and subunits, whose special skills and knowledge could be put at the service of the Islamist.
Military involvement in the group al-Mahdi is qualitatively different previous actions Moroccan security forces in their fight against this kind of organizations and bore a new dimension to the activities of those organizations. Despite the fact that earlier the Moroccan security services Salafi-jihadist destroyed cells, the latter did not have the structure inherent in traditional terrorist organizations. Grouping al-Mahdi in contrast to earlier had more traditional parameters of terrorist organizations that might mean a certain evolution in Morocco terrorist organizations, with the participation of the military, has the necessary experience and knowledge of training and organization of the group members. The local press even characterizes this group as a military organization, where several members were subjected to religious processing and operational skills possessed. Thus, al-Khattab was able to create an organization with a certain hierarchical structure, whose members not only acted alone, but also to coordinate their activities.
This fact meant a fundamentally new approach to the organization of Salafi-jihadist organizations in Morocco. Indeed, given the social inequality in the country and exposure to low-paid soldiers of corruption and outside influence, the Moroccan armed forces is an organization exposed to radical Islamists. At the turn of 2006-2007, the number of armed forces of Morocco approaching 196 thousand. People, among who were 75-100 thousand conscripts and 150,000 reservists. Every year in Morocco 353, 377 people reached draft age. Many of them continued to serve in the army, where they have a steady income, is not very high, but comparable to the minimum wage in Morocco at 223.30 US dollars.
In late 2007, the trial of a group of Khattab and al-Mahdi was postponed for compliance with all legal formalities and the formation of the defense. Despite the fact that some of the details on a group of al-Mahdi leaked to the press, the actions of the authorities to arrest the group was given a number of features that allow experts to talk about the serious danger of infiltration of Islamic radicals in the army.
So, August 31, 2006 the Moroccan authorities officially announced before the end of the period of military service by conscription into the armed forces. This step demonstrated the authorities feared exposure enlisted the influence of radical Islamists. Before the young man who has attained the age of 18, he served in the army for 18 months. Most are going to serve in the area of Western Sahara under Moroccan-administered. These actions of the authorities have always been considered unpopular and caused protests in the society. Reduction of compulsory military service was accompanied by job losses and rearrangements in the security services.
From his post as head of the Directorate General of National Security (Direction Generale de la Surete Nationale, DGSN) was deposed Gen. Hamid Laanigri (Hamidou Laanigri). Head of Military Intelligence (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, DST Belbashir General Mohammed (Mohammed Belbachir) also lost his job. At the same time, was dismissed from service 12 officers of territorial divisions of special services to the rank of major. Most of them have been replaced by civil servants personally loyal monarch. These retirement, experts say, could indicate a more widespread penetration of Islamists in the army than it was announced after the defeat of the group al-Mahdi.
At the same time it would be premature to say that the army so enjoyed the support of broad sections of the people that could shift the power by the monarch, and to establish Islamic rule, as was done in Iran in 1979. In this context, a step taken by the authorities to transfer military service on a contract basis, are a step in the right direction. Unlike soldiers conscripts from poor families contractors seemed more resistant to the Islamic call and could protect the army from the ranks of the penetration of radical Islamist elements. By the mid-2000s, the official unemployment rate in Morocco was 7.7% of the population. However, the number of underemployed was significantly higher, and not made public authority. Therefore, a small but steady income, which provides the army, was still attractive to the majority of young Moroccans. Despite the tense relations with Algeria, Morocco had no obvious foreign enemies. So be sure to call and could be considered, as a specific need for it was not observed.
After the bombings in Casablanca Moroccan authorities have become much more to do in terms of improving the socioeconomic status of the population, primarily the poor and the poor most at promoting the Salafi-jihadist ideas. On the other hand, the age structure of the group al-Mahdi debunked before a firm conviction that only the poor socioeconomic status is an incentive for the growing influence of Islamic ideas.
Before the bombings in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003 almost unaware of terrorist attacks by radical Islamist. Unlike Algeria, Morocco and Egypt have relatively immune to violence by Islamic radicals. Official policy of gradual implementation of the principles of democracy in the society and at the same time limiting military intervention in the management of public affairs could be a serious tool in the fight against poverty in the future acts of violence by Islamic radicals. The reorganization of the Moroccan security forces is an important step in terms of the weakening of the power of traditional Moroccan elite (makhzen), which retained its former influence during the reign of the new King Mohammed VI. It was necessary to take steps to improve the situation of the lower ranks in the army, so as to counter the spread of ideas in the armed forces of radical Islam and strengthen this important institution of the state.
In fact, the professional military in the Arab countries is quite indifferent to the Islamic ideology in general, whether secular principles of pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism or ideas. Thus, the majority of the Egyptian military rather calmly reacted to the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1962. And many of the military were at the forefront of the fight against militant Islam in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco. A number of Western scholars, mainly followers of SP Huntington believed that the professionalization and modernization of the army military force more work on improving professional skills “art of war” and not get involved in politics. At the same time, others believed that the professionalization of the military in the Middle East is unlikely necessarily lead to a de-politicization of the army and the voluntary submission to the civil authorities. Even in such a relatively democratic countries of the Middle East, which is the Turkey and Israel military high status in society predetermined by maintaining their place in politics? If you talk about countries with autocratic style of government, there is often associated with the military political center, the main element to preserve the unity of the state, its security and independence, which determines largely created their own myths about the revolution and independence.
Moreover, in most states in the Middle East, the professionalization of the military requires, above all, not a rejection of political responsibility, but rather the opposite – professional development and advancement in the management of the country most of trained personnel from the military to overcome suffered humiliation and defeat during the Arab Israeli wars in all the states of the Arab Maghreb rival elites fought for the right to represent their constituents. This rivalry actively participated along with military and civilian Islamist nationalists. While Islamist promised to give answers to complex socioeconomic issues and to protect society from hostile ideology of the West, the military promised to preserve the unity of the nation, to defend the fatherland and serve as a bridge between the outgoing of the past nationalism and a new identity. In each of the Maghreb countries had their own political foundations for such a competition of different groups. Compared with Algeria and Libya Morocco differs deeper Islamic roots. Famous religious centers Keyruana (Morocco) and Zeitun (Tunisia) managed to survive colonial rule. While the French in Algeria almost completely destroyed the national Islamic institutions and the Order of sinusitis in Libya survived only thanks to the support of Gaddafi. Therefore, in the per-revolutionary Morocco and Tunisia managed to keep Islam as adapted to moderate power and national power. In Algeria, after the revolution, the political vacuum was filled by the military with their revolutionary roots. This put Islamist before a choice: either accept the losses and withdraw from politics or continue to struggle often with the use of force.
In all these countries, the situation was complicated by the preservation of the traditions of the former metropolis. In Algeria, it was the force of the gendarmerie. Despite the fact that functionally gendarmerie was not part of the regular army, its organizational command structure was rooted in the Ministry of Defense. Along with the civilian police, the Algerian Gendarmerie performed a number of functions of the military police. In 1957, King Hassan II created the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie. However, the tradition of civil military police goes back a few centuries ago in Morocco. In Libya, the Italian Carabineers Corps served as a model of creation of the People’s Militia Libya, numbering 43,000 people, which is approximately the 50,000th Libyan army. These police forces were linked to the national armed forces. They had a common uniform, they often share intelligence, carry out joint training. Therefore, on the one hand it gave the army the ability to constantly involved in the civil sphere, and on the other enabled the Islamists to penetrate through the regular part of these militias, which control over their activities was clearly weaker.
Since the beginning of the process of democratization in Algeria in the early 90-is of XX century, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) rapidly gained popularity and won the first round of parliamentary elections in 1992. Revolutionized military seized power and before the second round of elections. Thus, the old order of things has been restored. Continued to operate the old political system, where the army has played a key role. This was followed by a wave of violence, the victims of which fell 150 thousand people dead and wounded. During the 90-ies of XX century the army’s role in politics and its prestige in the community continued to grow as the military fought against militant Islam. At the same time, a number of representatives of the Algerian society consider violence popular resistance against the old political system headed by the military and the refusal to Islamic organizations Front to participate in the elections. After the coup in 1992 the military ruled the country, appointed to key positions in the state generals. The president elected from the ranks of the Army (retired military type L. Zeroual (Liamine Zeroual) in 1994) or from the old revolutionary military structures. Military full control over the press, radio and TV. Thousands of people on the slightest suspicion were arrested and placed in secret prisons. The fate of many of them to this day unknown. At the same time, most of the mosques remained under the control of the Front.
In the 1999 elections the military supported by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was not so obvious puppet in the hands of the army and tried to seem independent. However, the elections were not as representative as the former. Despite the fact that according to official figures participated in the elections 61% of the eligible votes, according to the opposition 70-80% of the population boycotted the elections. The new president Abdelaziz Bouteflika faced a difficult choice. If he wanted to reform and an end to violence in the country, it was necessary to limit the power of the military, which actually brought him to power. One of his moves in this direction was the proposal to declare amnesty part of Islamic militants. This move has split the military, some of which stood on a strong stand against the Islamist, while the other part of this initiative has supported the president. Resistance plans Abdelaziz Bouteflika was so great that he had to dismiss six senior officers, before starting the amnesty program of the Islamists. Bouteflika dismissed from their posts 2 more senior generals. One of them was Mohammed Lamari (Mohamed Lamari), which played a crucial role in the abolition of the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992. The second was dismissed LaBrie Belheyr (Larbi Belkheir) – head of the presidential administration. Thus, A. Bouteflika made it clear that strive to become more independent from the army on political issues.
According to some experts, after the next president Abdelaziz Bouteflika is unlikely to be a soldier. Old Military Revolutionary Guard at that time would have to leave the political arena, and the new generals, despite their recognized public services in the struggle against militant Islamists will be forced to admit that the army and prevent violence. Despite the fact that the military continued to play a prominent role in the political life of the country, their influence is not as strong as it was 10 years ago. Today, the military is not represented by any one party and did not have a single candidate in the elections. This fact opens up new opportunities for civilian politicians, including from among the Islamists. Moreover, in recent years the authority of the military and the army’s role in the fight against Islamic Resistance had undergone major changes and not in favor of the military. Terrorist attacks in Algiers in 2007, a truck bomb attack in July 2007, the attack on the barracks of the Coast Guard in September 2007 – it all reminded citizens of the continuing threat of terrorism, and significantly reduced the military claims to their crucial role in the fight against Islamic resistance, and thus gradually forced them to abandon the old privileged role in society under the pretext of defense against terrorism.
In Tunisia, things were different. Father Tunisian independence Habib Bourguiba was a lawyer, not a military officer. And finding Tunisia’s independence was held in the framework of the civil law tradition. The liberation of Tunisia from the French colonial rule as a whole took place without conflict, and did not require such a broad intervention of the military and the armed struggle for independence, as it did in Algeria. Representatives of the ruling elite were from New Dustour Party represented socially student groups and trade unions, rather than revolutionary officers, later transform into the national army as it was in Algeria. So when H. Bourguiba did not find a common language with the Islamist, and the Tunisian economy began to plummet, the opposition power came not from the ranks of the army and of the firmly-established by the time of the Islamic organizations represented Tunisia’s Islamic Tendency Movement. Therefore, when the movement began to gain momentum, the interior minister in the government of Zein Al Abedin Bourguiba, Ben Ali invented the title of “president for life”. He isolated Bourguiba from real power and at the same time still removes the military and the Islamists of intro-elite struggle for power. Eventually he became president in 1987. Unlike Bourguiba, whose entourage consisted mainly of civilian reformers, and the military held a modest position in power, President Ben Ali came from the security services. Therefore, his entourage made not only military officers, as representatives of the security services and large commercial capital.
In Morocco, the military has also played a significant role in the political life of the country. King Hassan II relied on loyal to him personally elite, represented primarily from large landowners. After unsuccessful attempts of military coups 1971-1972 King took the army under full control. After his death in 1999, this tradition has continued the new King Mohammed VI. The new king has somewhat changed the composition of the traditional ruling elite, entering into its composition of their approximate number of technocrats. It also increased the number of persons admitted to the management of the affairs of the state by attracting some representatives of civil elites and previously banned opposition politicians and Islamic leaders. According to some experts support domineering king was as if the two circles. The first is the closest to the monarch circle included representatives of the Royal Chancery, and the military, along with representatives of the Islamic establishment and a large bureaucracy entered the second round, very far from the king. At the same time, relations with the military Mohammed VI were more even temper than it was under his father. King understood that in order to win the loyalty of the army, it is necessary to constantly provide new weapons. Recently, however, more and more influence on the army and weapons purchases carried out not only by the king as the Crown Prince Moulay Rachid (Moulay Rachid), which can often be seen in uniform as a member of military parades and ceremonies. If the Moroccan authorities and to create conditions that insure them against the risk of new attempts to seize power by the military, then, as the events of mid-2006, the monarchical power was faced with a new threat from militant Islamist.
Libya transition to independence in several stages. In the first phase based on the basis of the power of the monarchy at the base, which was a religious order sinusitis headed by Idris al-sinusitis. In 1969, Libya was a military coup, which was headed by Gaddafi under nationalist slogans. However, we can not say that Gaddafi is completely relied on the army. He created the executive body of the Revolutionary Command Council were represented mainly come from the middle class and minor tribes. Only a small number of high-ranking military took place there. The same goes for he created ministries. He gave a clear preference to civilians. Of the 17 ministries, only 2 were headed by the military. After creating “a society without a state” and replace ministries at People’s Committees in the 70s. XX century military lost control of the Ministry of Defense. These measures Gaddafi could not completely reduce the influence of the military. On the contrary, the most ambitious of them saw only one way to advance in power through military coup. Indeed the downturn of the economy in the 1970s, there were several unsuccessful attempts of military coups. This forced Gaddafi to replace the leadership of the army and security services to immigrants from his native tribe, so as to prevent new attempts coups.
By the early events of the “Arab Spring” in all countries of the Arab Maghreb role of the military in politics decreased significantly compared to earlier times. Military for quite a long time did not attempt to take power by force of arms, and the army is largely voluntarily returned to the barracks. However, with the rise of popular unrest and growth of radical Islam, which is clearly striving for power in these countries, special services which rely primarily relied leaders of these countries to ensure internal security, could not cope with the massive popular unrest, and then the army again took the reins in their hands.
The army and Islamist in the Arab Maghreb.
21 Tuesday Apr 2015
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