Tags
Will Russia fight in Syria
08 Tuesday Sep 2015
08 Tuesday Sep 2015
28 Tuesday Apr 2015
Владимир Ахмедов
«Русская команда» в Сирии?
По мере оттягивания сроков созыва конференции по Сирии международная активность, эпицентром которой должна стать Женева, где планируется ее проведение, нарастает прямо пропорционально эскалации вооруженной борьбы в самой Сирии, центром которой является сегодня Алеппо (Халеб). Ведущиеся наразличных международных площадках дипломатические сражения за «Женеву-I2» и кровопролитные бои за Алеппо (Халеб) идут пока параллельными путями, используют разные методы и средства, но, при этом, преследуют единую цель,- обеспечить переход власти в Сирии. Пока есть димир Ахмедовоснования надеяться, что вопреки законам Евклидовой геометрии эти пути могут, если не пересечься, то, хотя бы, совпасть.
На самом деле от результатов эвентуальной встречи в Женеве могут зависеть не только тысячи жизней сирийцев, но и судьба самой Сирии, дальнейших путей ее развития и перспективы установления нового порядка на Ближнем Востоке. В этой связи, остается надеяться, что периодические встречи министра иностранных дел России С. Лаврова с его американским коллегой, если и не расставят все точки над «i», то, хотя бы, дадут общее впечатление об истинных намерениях США и России по Сирии, вопрос, который волнует не только их европейских коллег, демонстрирующих растущую обескураженность происходящим, но и, прежде всего, всех сирийцев, как, впрочем, и остальных арабов и неарабов.
Но, если о возможных планах администрации Б. Обамы можно хоть как-то судить на основании многочисленных заявлений (официальных, полуофициальных, неофициальных) представителей различных ведомств США и союзнических им разного рода организаций, то позиция Москвы в сирийском вопросе, несмотря на всю «прозрачность и последовательность» нашей дипломатии продолжает вызывать много вопросов, как в арабском мире, так и на Западе. Понятно, что русская душа для Запада всегда была загадкой. Очевидно, поэтому они так тщательно продолжают изучать творчество Ф.М. Достоевского.
Между тем о российской политике в Сирии, с точки зрения предпринятых попыток объяснить ее, написано и сказано достаточно много на страницах различных изданий, «тонких и толстых» журналов, в многочисленных интервью и материалах различных ситуационных анализов, как в России, так и за рубежом. Но вопрос о том, что именно хочет Россия в Сирии, и почему Москва медлит с принятием окончательного решения по сирийскому вопросу, продолжает остро волновать значительную часть мировой общественности.
Чтобы не повторять известный набор положений и аргументов по данному вопросу, автор решил обратиться к воспоминаниям одного бывшего сотрудника сирийских спецслужб бригадного генерала И.М., прошедшего в одном из учебных центров в 70-х годах прошлого столетия суровую школу КГБ СССР, которыми он поделился на страницах одного арабоязычного интернет-издания.
По его оценке, при правлении Хафеза Асада до конца 1990-х годов Москва играла ключевую роль в определении основных направлений внешней политики Сирии. Во многом подобная исключительная роль СССР, а затем и РФ в Сирии обеспечивалась за счет ряда особых обстоятельств, одним из которых было наличие так называемой «русской команды» в теневых структурах сирийской власти. Ее представители имели возможность непосредственно влиять на механизм выработки решений по ключевым вопросам внешней политики страны.
«Русская команда» оформилась как организованная группа в начале 70-х годов и успешно действовала до конца 90-х годов XX века. В основном в ее состав входили выпускники советских военных вузов, часть из которых прошла обучение в разведывательных центрах КГБ СССР. Многие из них занимали весьма высокие посты в армии, сирийских спецслужбах, руководстве правящей ПАСВ. О большинстве из них мало кто знал на Западе и в странах Ближнего Востока. Ряд были известны исключительно в силу занимаемых ими высоких должностей на государственной службе. Но о наличии «русской команды» не знал практически никто, даже в самой Сирии. Характерно, что, несмотря на их широчайшие возможности, благодаря занимаемым постам в системе реальной власти, члены команды, как можно заключить из воспоминаний бригадного генерала. сотрудничали с Москвой в основном на идейной и общеполитической основе, исключительно в вопросах внешней политики и не касались «внутренней политической кухни» в Сирии. На наш взгляд данное обстоятельство могло свидетельствовать о высочайшей степени доверия между руководством Сирии и СССР (РФ) и наличием негласных договоренностей между соответствующими ведомствами двух стран.
Работа «команды» осуществлялась на достаточно благоприятном фоне, который определялся особым отношением Хафеза Асада к вопросам выработки внешней политики. Во-первых, внешняя политика при Х.Асаде носила исключительно прагматичный (светский) характер и была подчинена достижению главной цели, — утвердить место и роль САР как центра Арабского Машрика при сбалансированных отношениях Сирии с ИРИ и КСА и хороших отношениях с Западом. Во-вторых, Х.Асад считал, что сфера внешней политики не должна быть вотчиной «силовиков» и считал «перегибом» несанкционированное лично им вмешательство спецслужб в эту деликатную сферу. В этой связи, он старался сократить степень воздействия армии и спецслужб на процесс выработки важнейших внешнеполитических решений. В этой связи, имена многих подлинных архитекторов сирийской внешней политики были малоизвестны даже узкому кругу приближенных к сирийскому президенту, а предлагаемые решения лишь формально проводились через сирийский МИД.
Так, например, бригадный генерал И.М. был, по его словам, автором многих ключевых решений в вопросах выстраивания отношений Сирии с Ираном, Саудовской Аравией, Египтом и Ливаном в период с 1976 по 1999 годы. В силу вышеотмеченного отношения Х.Асада к роли спецслужб в вопросах внешней политики, члены «русской команды» действовали во многом автономно, вне рамок контроля со стороны сирийских силовых структур. В качестве примера И.М. приводит другого члена этой группы бригадного генерала М.С., который курировал один из важнейших участков российско-сирийского сотрудничества, и погиб при странных обстоятельствах в своем поместье на средиземноморском побережье в Латакии. Другой член «русской команды» А.А. больше известный в узких кругах под именем «аль-Ахтабут». Одной из его основных задач было недопущение «перекосов» во внешней политике САР, в результате волюнтаристского вмешательства в эту сферу руководства ряда ведущих сирийских спецслужб. Именно ему своей отставкой обязаны М.Холи и Б.Наджар.
Одним из немаловажных факторов эффективной работы «русской команды» было то, что ее члены не были коррумпированы, не ставили фактор личной наживы во главу угла своей работы, не испытывали личной материальной зависимости от Ирана и КСА и заботились о соблюдении баланса в отношениях САР со своими арабскими и региональными партнерами. По мнению, бригадного генерала И.М. «русская команда» действовала в интересах национальной безопасности Сирии, что полностью отвечало политике Москвы на Ближнем Востоке, которая смотрела на Дамаск как на свой форпост в регионе и старалась не навязывать сирийскому руководству свою политическую «повестку».
Любопытно, что, несмотря на свое широкое проникновение в Сирию, Иран узнал о существовании «русской команды» сравнительно недавно и был крайне насторожен этим обстоятельством. Однако в силу особых отношений с Москвой, Тегеран был вынужден мириться с ее существованием в недрах сирийской власти. В тоже время, нельзя исключать и того, что соответствующие ведомства ИРИ могли иметь задачу постепенно ослабить работу этой «команды» и снизить степень ее влияния на выработку внешнеполитических решений. Однако было бы наивным полагать, что лишь только Тегеран был в этом заинтересован, другие внешние игроки на сирийском поле могли ставить перед собой анологичную задачу. Нашлись противники «русской команды» и внутри самой Сирии.
Критическим для «русской команды» стал 1999 год, который оказался, насыщен целым рядом неблагоприятных событий для Сирии, сказавшихся, как оказалось впоследствии, крайне негативно на важнейших внутренних и внешнеполитических процессах развития страны. В этот период произошло сильное обострение болезни Х.Асада, что усилило соперничество за власть внутри его близкого окружения и, как следствие, содействовало углублению раскола внутри правящих элит. Именно в этот период «русской командой» решил вплотную заняться влиятельный генерал сирийских спецслужб Бахджет Сулейман. По словам И.М. он и прежде искал подходы к членам «команды», рассчитывая использовать их влияние для укрепления своего положения в ближайшем окружении Х.Асада. Однако тогда не смог найти с ними общего языка, и был отвергнут.
К концу 90-х годов ситуация внутри властной вертикали в САР серьезно изменилась в результате целой серии масштабных перестановок в армии и спецслужбах, которые проводил Х.Асад в рамках взятого им курса на безальтернативность Башара как своего преемника на властном поприще. Членам «русской команды» пришлось столкнуться с целым рядом очень влиятельных новых фигур внутри режима и постепенно их позиции начали ослабевать. Интересно, что, как рассказывает И.М., среди тех немногих, кто пытался помочь отдельным членам «команды» был Асеф Шаукат. Возможно, он просто не видел картины в целом, и не представлял с кем, именно, имеет дело. К тому же, в тот период он пользовался относительной независимостью, будучи мужем дочери Х.Асада и сестры будущего президента. Но даже его заступничество не смогло спасти некоторых членов «команды», которая вскоре фактически распалась и прекратила свою работу.
Постепенно их место в теневых структурах сирийской власти заняла группа Бахджета Сулеймана, который к тому времени сумел сблизиться с Башаром Асадом и его влиятельными кузенами. Одним из сподвижников Б. Сулеймана стал дивизионный генерал Хишам аль-Бахтияр, который стал отвечать за вопросы внешней политики и национальной безопасности САР. В узких сирийских кругах он хорошо известен как «человек Ирана в Сирии», на что указывает и его фамилия. Именно ему приписывают беспрецедентное сближение Дамаска с Тегераном, что крайне негативно сказалось на месте САР в Арабском Машрике, ввергло страну в бесконечную региональную борьбу, превратив Сирию в «игральную карту» в глобальной борьбе держав на Ближнем Востоке.
По словам бригадного генерала И.М. Москва видела, что происходит с ее прежней «русской командой». Возможно, следуя своему принципу не вмешиваться во внутренние дела дружественной Сирии, или исходя из каких-то других соображений, российское руководство на деле мало, что сделало, чтобы предотвратить уход этой группы из коридоров реальной власти в САР. С другой стороны, и в самой России к этому времени многое изменилось. Возможно, Москва решила попытаться укрепить свои отношения с новой командой на новой основе, которая более отвечала духу того времени, где одним из главных девизов стали свободные рыночные отношения. И, возможно, многое удалось сделать. И так бы все и продолжалось (еще какое-то время), если бы не «арабская весна».
Как вспоминает И.М. с самого начала «арабской весны» различные российские спецслужбы стали «рыскать» по Сирии в поисках членов своей прежней «русской команды». Однако Москву ждал неприятный сюрприз. В результате тщательных поисков обнаружилось, что никого, никого из членов «русской команды» не было даже на самых мало-мальски значимых постах в сирийском руководстве. Как, указывалось выше, Москва, конечно, осознавала, что «русская команда» постепенно слабеет. Но совсем не ожидала, что она будет «вычищена» с такой тщательностью.
Возможно, также и по этой причине, Москва продолжается держаться за Башара Асада и его режим, понимая, что если не вовремя (это ключевое словосочетание) отвернется от Дамаска, то рискует потерять Сирию, если не навсегда, то надолго.
Впервые опубликована в июле 2013 года
23 Thursday Apr 2015
Posted arab military, arab officers, arab ploitics, Assad, Ассад, Востоковедение в России, Сирия и США на Ближнем Востоке, армия на ближнем востоке офицерский корпус, личное, наука в России, iran-syria, middle east syria, Russia and the Middle East, Russia and USA in the Middle East, Save Syria, science in Russia, Syria Russia Iran Assad, Syria-Iran
inVladimir Ahmedov (PhD)
Save Syria: is military option the best only?
Some recent leaks of information indicate that in case of the failure of the upcoming political talks on Syria several regional countries led by America are considering the option of direct interventions (under pretext of battling ISIL) carried out by countries neighboring Syria. The core of this new plan consists of training some moderate rebel’s fronts in camps on the Turkish, Qatari, Jordanian and Saudi lands. The Saudi Arabia and Turkey are supposed to exert a major military pressure on specific fighting units near Damascus as well as in the South and the North. At least those preparations for now on have a clear policy aiming to shape the power balances in a way to affect any upcoming political negotiations.
On the other hand Egyptian-Turkish-Saudis differences (about the future role of the “Muslim Brothers” in Syria) is slowing the establishment of a joint Arab-Turkish ground force that could take part in the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIL and An-Nusra Front in Syria. Ankara insists that in order to allow access through lands for launching any ground operations to invade the lands controlled by the rebels in the Syrian north and north east, the operation must expand to include the areas controlled by Assad’s forces Meanwhile, Egypt is considering that the Arab-Turkish offense should be confined to the areas that are not controlled by Assad.
Washington believes that the Syrian opposition can enter the liberated areas and establish a government there in addition to security forces. In this case, negotiations can be held with the Assad regime in order for him to leave and to create united government. If the Assad regime collapses, then the opposition government can implement its control over the rest of Syria.
In this context, the plans of the pro-Damascus alliance to confront these new plans remain unclear so far. The Russians and the Iranians has already warned against the threat of reiterating the Libyan scenario in Syria. However, in view of the unilateral initiatives that were taken recently in Yemen it remains unclear how this warning will be translated in practice.
According to some Iranian opposition sources the rise of protests within the Iranian local arena due to the economic hardship and the spending on the wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, has forced Khamenei to order Brig. Dahkan to ask Russia and China to take some practical stands to support Iran in Yemen and Syria. Khamenei is insisting on proceeding with Iran’s external wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen fearing that taking a step back in these wars will lead to an internal bruising of the Tehran regiment.
As to Russia it in fact is trying now to by side itself from the active role in Yemeni crisis keeping the neutral position. But in Syria Moscow may change its stance. As have witnessed Moscow-1, 2 forums Russia does not have any other option in Syria then Assad whom it perceives as the only guarantor of Russian interests in Syria. To date, Moscow has no acceptable alternative to Assad.
This very fact plays, in my view, a real obstacle on the way forward towards a negotiated solution. If we agree with the fact that some people in Russia feel unhappy about the energy and effort expended in Syria on behalf of Assad, then the key question is can/want Moscow find an acceptable alternative to Assad and his inner circle.
By knowing a little Russian-Syrian relations, I would hardly believe that the extensive experience (for at least 2-3 decades) that Moscow had accumulated in Syria and with the Syrian army and special services – both these key actors of the Syrian drama- prevent us from finding a collection of Syrians (grown up in our military academies and civil universities) that will protect Russian interests in Syria and in a far more effective mode than the “half man” Assad’s regime.
In view of this if only Moscow could abandon Assad (under some special preconditions for him and alawi community) it may easily take the lead in laying the groundwork for a serious negotiation process that leads to a new leadership. But to help Russia take this hard choice the pro-rebel regional coalition must show it readiness to recognize Russian interests in the Levant (not only Syria).
On the other hand many in Moscow simply couldn’t imagine a situation when Assad is removed – one way or another – and the army and special services won’t dissolve. In my view military professionals will be highly wanted under any future power. Otherwise who’ll defend Syria? Nevertheless they still believe (persuade themselves and others) that removing the head will collapse the army. I wonder why for the last 4 years they didn’t revive an infrastructure (as they should do by now) of created in the past years human capital that can be trusted and which could hold the Syria together?
And is it a big price to replace Assad’s immediate circle with nationalist, pro-resistance moderate fighters and army officers (many of them speaks Russian) and political figures who can keep the country together as well as ensure the sea access that Moscow demand in exchange of freezing the conflict and rolling back (not in Ukraine) ISIS finally?
P.S. Only one thing can”soothe” me. That in this situation we are not alone, sharing our views with Iran, Hezbollah, some political circles in USA and Israel. But enough is enough. It’s time to Save Syria. And it would be better to do it by diplomatic rather then military means.
12 Thursday Mar 2015
Posted Assad, внешняя политика, внешняя политика россии на ближнем востоке, ислам, международные отношения, национальная безопасность, international politics, iran in the middle east, iran us middle east, iran-syria, middle east syria, national security, political islam, secularism and islamism in Arab world, Syria-Iran
inVladimir Ahmedov
US-Iran agreement: controversial political dimensions.
Many authorities in the Arab Mediterranean believe that the American-Iranian agreement is up coming and will be reaching in a very near time. Some even stress that the general framework of this agreement is practically completed.
They are even ready to admit Iran’s role in the Middle East as one of the region’s architects and game makers. Some Arab politics are nearly very close to accept the Iranian partnership in their countries local political affairs.
According to some Arab journalists and political sources the above mentioned agreement supposed to strengthen new Iran’s authority in the region, at first in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Iran will finally legalize its sovereign right to posses nuclear power (without producing a nuclear bomb) at exchange for acknowledge the legitimacy of its new leading role in the Middle East as a state with a good intentions and good management. (For the author it sounds like one of the Arabian tales 🙂
On the other hand thanks to this agreement the USA will change their image in the Middle East from a state of hostility to a state of progress in the negotiations in the name of reaching solid peace and stability in the region. Moreover due to this deal Obama Administration considers to improve the chances for the Democratic Party of succeeding to access the White House once again.
But there are many others in the Arab world and in the West who have contradictory opinion on this point. They are aware that the expansion of the Iranian presence in the region came as a result of the weak political will of some Arab’s rulers, their inability to resist the spreading of Iranian expansion due to the common Arabs’ regression, hesitation, and the luck of needed unity regards their “small issues” and differences.
There is no secret that today thanks to the drop in oil prices combined with the Western sanctions and deepest Iranian involvement in the Syrian crisis Iranian economy and social security have been suffering from many problems and difficulties for a long time. That very fact couldn’t help to avoid Iranian state from major changes on the structural levels of the existing regime.
Iran was forced to give up his close ally in Iraq Nouri al-Maliki and to accept partnership with the Kurds, the Sunnis and USA to prevent drowning its positions in the region. In Syria Iran in fact has failed to get anything more than maintaining the defragmented structure of Assad’s regime with some victories on the very narrow territory taking into account the fact that Syria has been destroyed and is near to be collapsed. Despite Hezbollah’s military power and authority, organization was unable to push Lebanon to the Iranian axis.
There is no wonder that after recent emotional exchange of messages between President Barack Obama’s and Guide of the Iranian Republic Ali Khomeini, 47 American Republican deputies have sent their own message to Tehran. They reportedly stressed the fact that whichever agreement might be written of by the next American president with the “stroke of a pen” and called Tehran to stop negotiations with US. It sounds horrific when the deputies of the nation are trying to prevent their own president from reaching a serious and influential deal in the name of world peace. But probably these congressmen’s might have some very serious reasons to make this unprecedented act.
The very fact that this extraordinary move was followed by the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Congress upon an invitation from the Republicans despite the will of the White House and its president shows the great significance of US-Iran normalization and the possibility that it might later affect the balances in the Middle East and the world.
The statement that have been recently made by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s advisor where he hinted that Iran was coming back to the Iranian empire with a center in Baghdad demonstrated that since 1979 revolution times have changed.
The battles conducted by General Qassem Soleimani while he crushing the cities and villages of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to raise the flag of this empire under the pretext of fighting ISIL and other “jihadists”, as well as atheism and neo-Ottomanism shows that Iranian regime has gone far away from its primary goals of a great popular revolution in support of the oppressed.
The open competition between Tel Aviv and Tehran over the role of the greater policeman in the Middle East undermines the hopes and dreams of millions of Arab’s citizens in USA as in a fair dealer in the region and a very possibility of good neighborly relations with all the both (Iran and Israel) and push many of them to continue resistance with whatever methods and whichever help to get rid of prescribed for them a New Order.
Vladimir Ahmedov (PhD) a senior researcher in the Moscow based Institute of Oriental Studies whose opinion may don’t reflect the official position of the Institute.
21 Sunday Dec 2014
Vladimir Ahmedov (PhD)
Hafez Makhlouf has secretly left Damascus for Moscow since last Friday(19.12.)
According to Syrian opposition General Hafez Makhlouf with his associates has “defected” to Moscow in the last 3 days to join his father.
He has no intention to come back in Syria.
His departure was under full directives from Iran that allegedly facilitated his defection.
Special sources from Damascus indicate that Assad has approved this move last week.
Amazing that other members of inner Asad’s circle were know nothing about this and got very angry by admitting H. Makhlouf as “defector”.
In Syrian opposition consider his departure as result of military developments on the ground, specially in Wady ad-Deiyef.
15 Saturday Nov 2014
Vladimir Ahmedov
Iran prepares for battle with ISIL in Levant
The war in Syria is promised to be a long. And today each party of conflict builds its own strategic plans for this country.
Today Syria is divided into four parts each of them runs by the conflicting parties that control a large part of the country. Those main parties are Assad’s regime and its allies, ISIL, JAN (an-Nusra Front) and FSA with its allies.
Strengthening the position of an “Islamic state” (IS) in Iraq and Syria and the start of the military operation forces of the international coalition against it significantly changes the balance of power in the Middle East and challenge Iran’s policy aimed at preserving and strengthening its influence in the Middle East.
Iran could help from not paying attention to several important aspects of politics and ideology of the IG, which it uses to strengthen its position in the region. Tehran also could not miss the fact that the IS is trying to extend its influence not only in Iraq and Syria, but in particular in Lebanon (Tripoli), Palestine (Gaza), as well as a number of countries of the Arab Maghreb.
Tehran feels some concerns about ideological and political plans of IG that, in particular, declare the idea of restoring “Caliphate”. This ides has found some support not only among considerable number of the Arab population, but among the part of the ruling Turkey elites as well.
A considerable part of the ruling Islamic party and its opposition from nationalists circles have found much in common in their calculation of the potential conversion of the ideological “chimera” in very specific political actions based on the increasingly popular idea of “New Ottomans”.
Naturally, situation like this could represent contiguous threat to ambitious political plans of Tehran in the region of the Middle East.
In fact IG pose a real threat to the states systems of many Arab states that has been established over the past decades in the Middle East, breaking their national structure and national sovereignty and erodes national identity of Middle Eastern counties that has been created as a resulting of Anglo-French partition of Ottoman legacy in the Middle East.
In case of successful implementation of at least a part of these IG plans on the occupied territories, it can pose a real threat to the preservation of internal stability and national sovereignty of the Iranian state, which includes a significant part of various ethnic and religious communities.
A spillover spread of IS in Levant and its growing political ambitions in the region that attract more its supporters from different countries, including neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan (so called Horasan group that puzzled many experts) and Iran as well forced Tehran and its confident supporter ”Hezbollah” to act aiming to create a solid military and political infrastructure in Levant that could prevent any challenge to Iranian and “Hezbollah” position what ever situation might turned out.
Amazing that Hezbollah like in previous Soviet Union builds its strategy on Syria on 5 year plan. In accordance with this plan Hezbollah creates its arsenals and defense factions in Syria. Hezbollah doesn’t want that prolonged Syrian war may affect its position in Lebanon and has no desire to pay the human and logistic price for its presence in Syria.
That’s why Hezbollah’s leadership has recently adopted a plan according to which a special framework should be sett for Syria and that country must be put in place under a separate authority affiliated to the Shura Council, first of all to its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
More over Hezbollah has stepped away beyond the Lebanese borders and is trying to consolidate its strategic presence not only in Syria but Iraq and Yemen as well. But nevertheless the presence of Hezbollah representatives and separate units in above mentioned countries in which they can run their special operations they all in a way or other are connected to Lebanon because all those four scenes (Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni) are in touch.
But as Syria till now remains a mains a battle scene Hezbollah has decided to establish there a military force from more over 50 thousands fighters which they plan to recruit from the different strata of the Syrian population mainly from Syrians that have recently under massive and aggressive Iranian propaganda have converted to Shia’a, in addition to different sects of Christians, Druze and even Sunnis modeling the Resistance factions in Lebanon. At the same time high ranking Hezbollah operatives are in constantly touch with the command sources in Syria and Iraq to guide them form Lebanon.
Regards these global jihadist plans of Hezbollah in the Middle East one may wonder is front with Israel still open and what differ so much Hezbollah from ISIL in view of ideological doctrine proclaimed in their political plans?
It’s very obvious that these ambitions Hezbollah plans may see the light and be effectively implemented only with the guidelines and help form Iran that consider Levant as it’s high priority of its national security and a key element in its global fight with Sunnis for dominance in the region.
Thus according to some reliable sources in Syrian opposition in the country and abroad, Iran has lunched recently the special program to create in Syria parallel to Syrian national army new special fighting forces under the name “National security units” (NSU).
It has become now very clear that national Syrian forces are severely damaged (if not to say ended as a real army) and loses in its personnel overcame any reasonable limits. More over regimes calculations to correct this situation by lunching a new recruiting campaign at calling the reserve troops has failed even in Tartous and Latakia.
Reportedly those new forces (NSU) are supposed to be overseen directly by officers from Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) and Hezbollah officers as well. Those units will be deployed over the different areas in Syria. This very fact may indicate that Iran now acts in Syria with so called “open face” and need no more to hide in shadow like it did in the past two years. On the other side it demonstrates Iranian keenness in Syrian affairs and shows that Iran tends to take under its full control all security and administrating strategies in Syria.
This new Iranian “perestroika” and “openness” (praying Rahbar will follow Gorbachev’s policy in other fields) in Syria marks in fact a very peculiar situation for the Syrian army on the ground where NSU with the help of some Baath factions (for décor, of cause, or where lays Iranian official ideology of “velaity fakih” and secular, Arab nationalism of Baathism?) will replace the national defense forces and represent the main military force. Assad’s Syria may forget about its national sovereignty. According to the same sources NSU will pay for their officer salaries between 30-50 thousand Syrian pounds monthly and gives some other incentives.
In establishing its new army in Syria Tehran counts on that call (first of all in Iran) for mandatory (reserve) military services that supposed to cut down the monthly salaries of their national defense forces (a very dangerous and controversial measure in our view) and on calling mercenaries form all over the world promising them new adventures and opportunities to gain some money. Iran wouldn’t be Iran (at least in their strategic planning) if it didn’t tray at first its plan. Some knowledgeable sources claim that in September-October Iran has already established one of such unite in Golan region under the name of “Suweida Shield faction” (SSF). But it wasn’t successive much due to the lack of the support from local population. No doubt that this time Iran will teach this lesson and act more accurately
At this stage of development of the military-political situation in the Middle East IG considered in the Iranian leadership as potential threat or rival for Tehran plans to strengthen its ideological and political influence in the region. Therefore, in recent months, IRI with the help of its allies from Lebanese “Hezbollah» has taken a number of active military and political steps that would supposed to ensure the preservation of Iran’s position in the Levant in any possible scenario in the region.
Over the past year, IS successfully penetrated in the fabric of Arab revolutionary movements, which was supported by Iran to strengthen its position in the region. On the other hand, in Syria, for example, IG is fighting not so much against Assad regime but more against the West and it supports from the Syrian armed opposition forces.
At the same time, IS is committed to the overthrow of existing Arab regimes in other countries, considering the policies of their rulers in their takfiri conceptions as unjust and inappropriate to the standards of “true” Islam. From this perspective, IG may pose a potential threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
On the other hand, the above mentioned threat posed by IS for Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, and its anti-Western sentiment impressed Tehran. Iran expects to use them in a dialogue with the West on the nuclear issue, and to force the United States to recognize Tehran as a part of the newly created system of regional security in the Middle East. In other word the best thing that might happen between B. Obama and Tehran’s mullahs was IS.
In this regard, one can not exclude that due to the changing political conjecture in the region, IS may be started to consider in Tehran not only as a “rival” but as a temporary “companion” for use in the implementation of their strategic plans in the Middle East.
Just remember that until recently Iran that has a serious military and political position in Iraq has relatively easy “surrendered” his faithful ally, N. al-Maliki and didn’t seriously opposed IG at the first stages of its military operations in Iraq, which led to the seizure of a number of strategically important facilities and large urban centers (Mosul).
By Vladimir Ahmedov (PhD) senior researcher form Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies whose views don’t necessarily reflects the official position of Institute.
12 Wednesday Nov 2014
Vladimir Ahmedov
Iran and the “Islamic State”: a dialectic of relationship.
Strengthening the position of an “Islamic state” (IG) in Iraq and Syria and the start of the military operation forces of the international coalition against it significantly changes the balance of power in the Middle East and challenge Iran’s policy aimed at preserving and strengthening its influence in the Middle East.
Iran could help from not paying attention to several important aspects of politics and ideology of the IG, which it uses to strengthen its position in the region. Tehran also could not miss the fact that the IG is trying to extend its influence not only in Iraq and Syria, but in particular in Lebanon (Tripoli), Palestine (Gaza), as well as a number of countries of the Arab Maghreb.
Tehran feels some concerns about ideological and political plans of IG that, in particular, declare the idea of restoring “Caliphate”. This ides has found some support not only among considerable number of the Arab population, but among the part of the ruling Turkey elites as well.
A considerable part of the ruling Islamic party and its opposition from nationalists circles have found much in common in their calculation of the potential conversion of the ideological “chimera” in very specific political actions based on the increasingly popular idea of “New Ottomans”.
Naturally, situation like this could represent contiguous threat to ambitious political plans of Tehran in the region of the Middle East.
In fact IG pose a real threat to the states systems of many Arab states that has been established over the past decades in the Middle East, breaking their national structure and national sovereignty and erodes national identity of Middle Eastern counties that has been created as a resulting of Anglo-French partition of Ottoman legacy in the Middle East.
In case of successful implementation of at least a part of these IG plans on the occupied territories, it can pose a real threat to the preservation of internal stability and national sovereignty of the Iranian state, which includes a significant part of various ethnic and religious communities.
Over the past year, IG successfully penetrated in the fabric of Arab revolutionary movements, which was supported by Iran to strengthen its position in the region. On the other hand, in Syria, for example, IG is fighting not so much against Assad regime but more against the West and it supports from the Syrian armed opposition forces.
At the same time, IG is committed to the overthrow of existing Arab regimes in other countries, considering the policies of their rulers in their takfiri conceptions as unjust and inappropriate to the standards of “true” Islam. From this perspective, IG may pose a potential threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
At this stage of development of the military-political situation in the Middle East IG considered in the Iranian leadership as potential threat or rival for Tehran plans to strengthen its ideological and political influence in the region. Therefore, in recent months, IRI with the help of its allies from Lebanese “Hezbollah» has taken a number of active military and political steps that would supposed to ensure the preservation of Iran’s position in the Levant in any possible scenario in the region.
On the other hand, the above mentioned threat posed by IG for Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, and its anti-Western sentiment impressed Tehran. Iran expects to use them in a dialogue with the West on the nuclear issue, and to force the United States to recognize Tehran as a part of the newly created system of regional security in the Middle East. In other word the best thing that might happen between B. Obama and Tehran mullahs was IG.
In this regard, one can not exclude that due to the changing political conjecture in the region, IG may be started to consider in Tehran not only as a “rival” but as a temporary “companion” for use in the implementation of their strategic plans in the Middle East.
Just remember that until recently Iran that has a serious military and political position in Iraq has relatively easy “surrendered” his faithful ally, N. al-Maliki and didn’t seriously opposed IG at the first stages of its military operations in Iraq, which led to the seizure of a number of strategically important facilities and large urban centers (Mosul).
11 Tuesday Nov 2014
Posted Иран ИГИЛ Ирак Сирия, ближний восток арабские революции конфессионализм национализм, ислам, конфессиональный сепаратизм, международные отношения, национальная безопасность, iran in the middle east, iran-syria, political islam, regional security, secularism and islamism in Arab world, Syria-Iran
inВладимир Ахмедов
Иран и «Исламское Государство»: диалектика взаимоотношений.
Укрепление позиций «Исламского Государства» (ИГ) в Ираке и Сирии и начало военной операции сил международной коалиции против него существенно меняет баланс сил на Ближнем Востоке и бросает определенный вызов политике Ирана по сохранению и укреплению своего влияния в ближневосточном регионе.
В Иране не могли не обратить внимания на ряд важных аспектов политики и идеологии ИГ, которые оно использует для укрепления своих позиций в регионе. Тегеран не мог также пройти мимо того факта, что ИГ пытается распространить свое влияние за переделы Ирака и Сирии, в частности в Ливане (Триполи), Палестине (Газа), а также ряде стран Арабского Магриба.
Определенную озабоченность Тегерана вызывают идеологические политические планы ИГ, которые, в частности, декларируют идею восстановления «Халифата», что находить определенную поддержку не только среди немалого количества населения арабских государств, а также среди части правящей элиты Турции.
Характерно, что немалая часть правящей исламской партии и ее националистической оппозиции находят немало общего в расчетах возможной конвертации этой идеологической «химеры» в совершенно конкретные политические шаги на основе набирающей популярность идеи «нового османизма».
Естественно, подобная ситуация, не может не представлять сопредельную угрозу амбициозным политическим планам Тегерана в регионе Ближнего и Среднего Востока.
ИГ бросает вызов сложившейся на протяжении последних десятилетий системе государственности в регионе, ломая структуру национального суверенитета и размывая национальную идентичность ближневосточных государств возникших в результате англо-французского передела Османского наследства на Ближнем Востоке.
В случае успешной реализации хотя бы части планов ИГ на захваченных территориях, это может представлять реальную угрозу сохранению внутренней стабильности и национального суверенитета Иранского государства, в составе которого представлены различные национальности и религиозные общины.
За последний год ИГ сумело активно внедриться в ткань арабских революционных движений, которые в сове время поддержал Иран, чтобы укрепить свои позиции в регионе. С другой стороны, в Сирии, например, ИГ сражается не столько против режима Асада, сколько против Запада и поддерживаемых им сил сирийской вооруженной оппозиции.
В тоже время ИГ стремится к свержению существующих арабских режимов в других странах, рассматривая политику их правителей в рамках своих такфиристских установок как неправедную и несоответствующих нормам истинного Ислама. С этой точки зрения ИГ может представлять потенциальную угрозу стабильности Саудовской Аравии и ряда других арабских монархий Персидского залива.
На данном этапе развития военно-политической ситуации на Ближнем Востоке и вокруг него, ИГ рассматривается в иранском руководстве как потенциальная угроза или соперник планам Тегерана по укреплению своего идеологического и политического влияния в регионе. Поэтому в последние месяцы ИРИ, используя, в том числе, свои возможности в ливанской «Хизбалле», предприняло ряд активных военно-политических шагов, которые могли бы обеспечить сохранение позиций Ирана в Леванте при любом развитии ситуации в регионе.
С другой стороны, указанная выше угроза, представляемая ИГ для арабских монархий Персидского залива, и его антизападные настроения импонируют Тегерану. Иран рассчитывает их использовать в диалоге с Западом по ядерному вопросу, а также вынудить США признать Тегеран частью вновь создающейся системы региональной безопасности на Ближнем Востоке.
В этой связи нельзя исключать того, что при определенных изменениях политической конъюнктуры в регионе, ИГ может начать рассматриваться в Тегеране не только в качестве соперника, но как временного «попутчика» для использования в реализации своих стратегических планов на Ближнем Востоке.
Достаточно вспомнить, что еще совсем недавно Иран, обладающий серьезными военными и политическими позициями в Ираке, сравнительно легко пошел на «сдачу» своего верного союзника Н. аль-Малики. А также практически не оказал какого-либо серьезного противодействия ИГ на первых этапах его военных операций в Ираке, приведших к захвату ряда стратегических важных объектов и крупных городских центров (Мосул).
08 Saturday Nov 2014
Posted arab military, arab officers, arab ploitics, arabesky.livejournal.com, army in the middle east, Assad, армия на ближнем востоке офицерский корпус, ислам, национальная безопасность, hezbollah iran, international politics, international relations, iran in the middle east, iran-syria, middle east syria, national security, сирия, Russia and the Middle East, Syria, Syria-Iran
inTags
arab military, arabesky.livejournal.com, Assad, национальная безопасность, middle east syria, national security
Vladimir Ahmedov
Syrian partition
The war in Syria is promised to be a long. And today each party of conflict builds its own strategic plans for this country.
Today Syria is divided into four parts each of them runs by the conflicting parties that control a large part of the country. Those main parties are Assad’s regime and its allies, ISIL, JAN (an-Nusra Front) and FSA with its allies.
Amazing that Hezbollah like in previous Soviet Union builds its strategy on Syria on 5 year plan. In accordance with this plan Hezbollah creates its arsenals and defense factions in Syria. Hezbollah doesn’t want that prolonged Syrian war may affect its position in Lebanon and has no desire to pay the human and logistic price for its presence in Syria.
That’s why Hezbollah’s leadership has recently adopted a plan according to which a special framework should be sett for Syria and that country must be put in place under a separate authority affiliated to the Shura Council, first of all to its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
More over Hezbollah has stepped away beyond the Lebanese borders and is trying to consolidate its strategic presence not only in Syria but Iraq and Yemen as well. But nevertheless the presence of Hezbollah representatives and separate units in above mentioned countries in which they can run their special operations they all in a way or other are connected to Lebanon because all those four scenes (Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi and Yemeni) are in touch.
But as Syria till now remains a mains a battle scene Hezbollah has decided to establish there a military force from more over 50 thousands fighters which they plan to recruit from the different strata of the Syrian population mainly from Syrians that have recently under massive and aggressive Iranian propaganda have converted to Shia’a, in addition to different sects of Christians, Druze and even Sunnis modeling the Resistance factions in Lebanon. At the same time high ranking Hezbollah operatives are in constantly touch with the command sources in Syria and Iraq to guide them form Lebanon.
Regards these global jihadist plans of Hezbollah in the Middle East one may wonder is front with Israel still open and what differ so much Hezbollah from ISIL in view of ideological doctrine proclaimed in their political plans?
It’s very obvious that these ambitions Hezbollah plans may see the light and be effectively implemented only with the guidelines and help form Iran that consider Levant as it’s high priority of its national security and a key element in its global fight with Sunnis for dominance in the region.
Thus according to some reliable sources in Syrian opposition in the country and abroad, Iran has lunched recently the special program to create in Syria parallel to Syrian national army new special fighting forces under the name “National security units” (NSU).
It has become now very clear that national Syrian forces are severely damaged (if not to say ended as a real army) and loses in its personnel overcame any reasonable limits. More over regimes calculations to correct this situation by lunching a new recruiting campaign at calling the reserve troops has failed even in Tartous and Latakia.
Reportedly those new forces (NSU) are supposed to be overseen directly by officers from Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) and Hezbollah officers as well. Those units will be deployed over the different areas in Syria. This very fact may indicate that Iran now acts in Syria with so called “open face” and need no more to hide in shadow like it did in the past two years. On the other side it demonstrates Iranian keenness in Syrian affairs and shows that Iran tends to take under its full control all security and administrating strategies in Syria.
This new Iranian “perestroika” and “openness” (praying Rahbar will follow Gorbachev’s policy in other fields) in Syria marks in fact a very peculiar situation for the Syrian army on the ground where NSU with the help of some Baath factions (for décor, of cause, or where lays Iranian official ideology of “velaity fakih” and secular, Arab nationalism of Baathism?) will replace the national defense forces and represent the main military force. Assad’s Syria may forget about its national sovereignty. According to the same sources NSU will pay for their officer salaries between 30-50 thousand Syrian pounds monthly and gives some other incentives.
In establishing its new army in Syria Tehran counts on that call (first of all in Iran) for mandatory (reserve) military services that supposed to cut down the monthly salaries of their national defense forces (a very dangerous and controversial measure in our view) and on calling mercenaries form all over the world promising them new adventures and opportunities to gain some money. Iran wouldn’t be Iran (at least in their strategic planning) if it didn’t tray at first its plan. Some knowledgeable sources claim that in September-October Iran has already established one of such unite in Golan region under the name of “Suweida Shield faction” (SSF). But it wasn’t successive much due to the lack of the support from local population. No doubt that this time Iran will teach this lesson and act more accurately
In view of these new Iranian-Hezbollah inventions in Syria one may wonder what the real difference between them and ISIL or JAN who act the very same way and apply the same tactics in concurred areas of Syria. Is it only ideology that serves at first and foremost to mobilize local population and win their support? And who said that Shia’a unlike Sunnis is less keen to Jihadism? May be those who missed lectures about the first decades of Arabs history after Prophet’s death or those who forgot His parting wishes cited in al-Quran: “…. don’t divide in your faith (religion)”? (Author apologizes if he wasn’t correct in citing Quran’s texts).
And one more word. Some times an author couldn’t help from some sort of “fascinating” of Iranian policy in the Middle East and in Syria in particular. And let my Syrian friends, especially those who suffer from Assad’s barbaric policy blame me on those word.
But from my Russian point I sometimes think what ever we were able to implement that same strategic planning, political wisdom, analytical perditions combined with such an adamant will and some sort of cynics (in one punch) in our politics in Syria.
May be we could save thousands of lives, preserve the regime and its military, forced them to provide some simplest reforms (demanded by the most of Syrians) and help to avoid the damaging and partition of Syria and emerging ISIL and other Jihadists factions. May be if we could act more decisively, press more on Assad and his inner circle, think more about our strategic goals as a State (not group of interests) we could avoid what we witness now in Ukraine and force our American partners to think twice before meddling in our “cosa nostra” in Ukraine.
Or may be in my 50-th I’m yet naive sometimes, – the fact that enjoys me. But for sure upsets my closest and some “friends” (in the hood).
By Vladimir Ahmedov (PhD) senior researcher form Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies whose views don’t necessarily reflects the official position of Institute.
16 Thursday Oct 2014
Vladimir Ahmedov
The Kobani issue and time to act.
The current situation around Kobani reflects all complicities that Coalition challenges now in its war against ISIL. It is quite obvious that the Kobani issue is no longer a sphere of only Ankara’s responsibility . The future of this small city in the Syrian-Turkish border may predestine the pass of further actions of Coalition and the “end game” in Syria and Iraq, as well. Besidesб Kobani has become now a part of responsibility of the international community and touchstone of the capacity of the coalition forces to some decisive actions.
It is quiet obvious that after Kobani follows next battle that will take place along the axes of Baghdad and Al-Halla in Karbala. And after Al-Anbar (if it falls) the catastrophe won’t know their limits and there will no longer be one safe location in Baghdad or Southern Iraq.
Besides, the anti ISIL’s Coalition has appeared wasn’t as united in its aims as had been excepted. Of the sidelines of the Mediterranean-Gulf forum that recently concluded its activities in Sardinia, US surprisingly considered that their allays from some Arab and European countries weren’t very happy with the American strife to impose the situation in Iraq and Syria on them, while disregarding the growing extremism in Sinai and Libya and the fact that main flow of Jihadists in Syria comes from very calm and “democratic” Tunisia.
Regards recent impressive victories of the Syrian rebels in Qalamoun region and in Quneitra and Southern Syria, as well that may open direct way to storm Syrian capital in nearest time US must support them instead of building plans to create a new National Syrian Army.
By no means Iran is still a main factor in all this calculations and developments. It is well known that Tehran proceeds in its strategy of maintaining Assad regime in power. This very fact is unlikely be accepted neither by Saudi Arabia nor by any other Arab state taking part in the Alliance.
On the other hand it is worth to mention that Iran has been present in Iraq since before the collapse of Mosul and Tikrit, not saying about its implications in Al-Anbar and Diyala files. But Iranians implication in Iraq is not like the selective implications in Syria.
Of cause Iran has real fears over the regime in Damascus despite Washington’s reassurances that the war of the Alliance against the ISIL is not targeting Iran’s ally Assad. Turkey’s calls to establish a buffer zone in northern Syria in addition to a no fly zone that may finally develop into toppling Assad fears Iran as well. That’s why Iran’s present moves in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and its statements and actions, reflect its fears from potential changes in Syria
But if the war against ISIL lasts long and leads to mass chaos and distractions in both Syria and Iraq, Tehran is unlikely want to be involved into the Syria – Iraqi swamp. Specially that won’t generate major benefits for Iran’s security (and Gulf as well) and Iran may loose all its effort, money and men that it has already put in Syria and Iraq. Besides this Tehran understands well that today’s international coalition is not based on the American occupation of Iraq and US has completely new calculations. And the last thing Tehran wants to see in the Syria is “American (or Turkish) boots on the ground” combined with Western sanctions.
In view of this new developments Iranian position may start changing. Iran for the first time has recently discussed ISIL’s problem with Washington. That fact was admitted by Iranian Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, Hussein Amir Abdul Lahyan.
In this regard, maybe the way that Coalition deals with Iran is a grave mistake? Iran should not have been marginalized, but Alliance rather benefits from it. If some in the “West” could set aside selfishness and fondness of power, and told Iranians that they were the party to help find a solution in Syria, they might welcomed it and participated positively.
Eventually, if Iranian Sash had found his last asylum in Egypt why Tehran couldn’t pay for Arabs with the same coin (frenga)?